The Universities and Training for the Clergy[1]

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In a recent most interesting paper in this *Review*, Mr McNaught has discussed the question of the supply of clergy which is of so much interest to Churchmen.[2] He lays great stress on the importance of a far wider system of Recruiting. Incidentally he has reaffirmed the desirability, almost the necessity, of securing a university training for all candidates. I need hardly say how entirely I accord with his aims, but on the second point, after working on this subject for eighteen years, I and all of us at Kelham have come very deliberately to an entirely opposite conclusion. I am indebted to the courtesy of the Editor for the opportunity of explaining our reasons more fully than we have yet done. I should like to make clear at once that this has not been with us a matter of theory. The men with whom we have to deal may be roughly summarised as belonging to the varied genus of 'clerks' of ages varying from 15–23. A few were artisans, a fairly large number shopmen. Some came straight from school. A few were from the professional class. But, roughly speaking, nearly all were, might have been or would have been, clerks. For some years we selected our men somewhat carefully; attainments weigh for something, but intelligence and high purpose are two factors we look for especially. The men come about equally from elementary, higher grade and small grammar schools. We have also a certain number of Oxford and Cambridge graduates mostly rather above the average.

We have at one time, or another occupied three somewhat different positions. At first, we assumed that the University system was the ideal, but we concluded that, for various incidental reasons it was not suited to men of this class. The objections we felt were rather incidental to the forms of life than essential, and I am not inclined to press them here. After a time, however, we began to feel very sceptical about the University system itself in its practical results on the larger number of men. Finally we considered that on grounds of principle, it was altogether a false method for the training of clergy. These last two points I must ask leave to treat separately. Both require that we should go down to fundamental ideas of education, first in itself, secondly in its relation to Christianity and the priesthood.

By education, we mean a training of the mind to reflection by which it passes from particulars to universals, details to principles, facts to laws, in human affairs from actions to aims. The Greek philosophers called it the search for the One among the Many. We find ourselves in a world of separated phenomena. To the untrained mind, they are roughly synthesized for practical purposes by 'rule-of-thumb'. The capacity or habit of 'understanding' things which belongs to the trained mind, implies thereby the entering into some connection or continuity between them. We call this their explanation or meaning. Thinking is more than one of the main objects of education; it is

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[1] Originally published in the *University Review* 1908. Republished by Sherratt & Hughes, London, 1909.
[2] *University Review*, May 1908, vol. vi, No34.

rather its very essence or substance. Even the training of observation, which is one of the secondary aims of education, means in reality the direction of attention to phenomena bearing on principles which are understood, and is therefore rather mental than physical.

Confining myself to the general question and leaving out therefore whatever is special to Christianity and the priesthood, the methods of education must be varied in practice: 1) according to age of the subject; 2) according to the progress already made; 3) according to ability and mental constitution.

I refer to the first of these points mainly to avoid confusion. The education for boys is merely preparatory. Before we can bring the man into the world of thought, we must first provide him with necessary tools, such as 'the three Rs' and we must further give him some better notion than his own narrow experience would supply of the enormous number of facts in the world which require understanding. Nature has allowed for this process. The boy's best powers are his curiosity and his memory. He is not disposed to philosophise. He sees no point in it. Some categories he must have, but they are few and exceedingly definite.

Reflection is the proper business of the man, therefore of the education of the university. This very much reflects my second point. I do not want to dwell on it at length but, whenever we have to deal with grown men whose education has not been continuous – as must happen in the movement in which Mr McNaught and I are so much interested – we must be content to take men as men. It is no longer possible to put them back to the fourth form studies at which they left off.

The main point which I want to discuss here is the third, the difference of method required in the treatment of the clever man and the merely average man, for it is in this, as it seems to me, that our universities fail, or at least the older universities with which I am most familiar. No one will care to deny that they do turn out extremely good results. Unfortunately few of us care to remember that they turn out also a large quantity of exceedingly poor results. We may not feel inclined to go so far as an eminent university man, formerly a fellow and tutor of his college, who once said to me, 'There is no greater educational fraud, palmed off on the British public than the pass degree', but we cannot help feeling that, so far as ability, or even interest, in thinking are concerned, a vast number of the pass and lower honours men are quite uneducated.

So far as the clever man is concerned, our work is fairly obvious. Omitting peculiar cleverness, such as exceptional memory, he is essentially, or for the most part, a man who thinks naturally. Our main business is to see that he thinks rightly that he does not start making up theories till he has the facts, and as nearly as may be the whole of the facts to go upon. Thence we get the sound rule – first the scholarship, then philosophy. This is really necessary for him. Theorising is very easy and very delightful. The steady drudgery of acquiring knowledge is a wholesome discipline. Of course, 'the whole of the facts' is a very big undertaking. We can only get a man to face them by narrowing his subject, by specialising. We are all rather uncomfortable about this specialising. We know its dangers only too well, but we can defend it on two grounds. 1) These clever men are going to be leaders. We hope they are going to get us all on a bit, and our leaders must be specialists. 2) After all, when our clever man has learnt sound methods of study, we can in general trust his natural intellectual interest to widen the areas. He will not stand still where we leave him.

When we come to deal with the averagely stupid man, it seems to me the universities are somewhat lost. In talking of the 'averagely stupid', we must admit that the average men are for the most part stupid. Of course there are men so stupid that they cannot be educated at all, and of them I have no

more to say. The university ought not to pretend to do it. I am speaking of the average man who has powers which can be drawn out, though they are not great. Of course also, we have to remember that no system in the world will make a stupid man clever. No one will ever pull more than his weight. But it is very easy to make a clever man stupid, and still easier to make a stupid man hopeless. Unfortunately in life it is always simpler to retain methods than to think out principles. Still more unfortunately, in universities, the authorities are all clever men. Stupid men are rather a perplexity to them, I do not think it occurs to them that there are principles of stupidity. The necessary modifications of procedure seem quite obvious. The stupid man hates thinking and does it very badly. We shall not be able to get him very far, so we must narrow the subject still more, and be as thorough as may be. He may acquire some scholarship, some knowledge; we can make him do some reading. Perhaps we had better drop the 'subject' and confine ourselves to set books. At least he can get these up.

Now if there is any truth at all in my analysis of the principles underlying the training of the clever man, it will follow that this modification of it is fundamentally wrong at every step, and I am prepared to show that the errors in it exactly correspond to and account for those very results which we all confess and deplore. The primary difference we have to start from is acknowledged on all hands. The not-clever man is the man without aptitude for ideas, the man who does not think, and who shirks thinking just because it is so difficult for him. The problem therefore is not merely different it is absolutely antithetical. In the one case you may have to curb thinking in order to guide it; in the second almost your whole problem is to induce the man to think at all. You have to begin therefore by showing him what thought is like, how it is done, what use can be made of it. I say deliberately you must 'begin' with it. You can give a clever man a large mass of facts to start with, because he will always be sifting, arranging, feeling his way to laws and meanings for himself, getting ready for the more scientific study of them which comes later. But that process produces very rapidly a sheer mental paralysis in the stupid man. He loses all interest and life. His whole hope will be set on the time when he may never have to look at a book again. If ever you get up to meanings, you will find he has by then forgotten all the facts. His mind does not want 'discipling', it wants encouraging.

I am afraid it may seem paradoxical, but the tutor's first step must be to lighten the load of facts as far as he possibly can. He must pick out those which are really necessary to support the main theory, explanation, meaning or interpretation he wants to have understood. This is the part of the lecture. As soon as the man has got his mind to work, he may be allowed to do a little reading. That will enable him to see what the significant facts look like when they are found amid a crowd of other facts, how and why selection was made. He will have a chance to see how much the ideas given him will interpret; it is no small matter that he will see how much interest they give. And he may be encouraged to read other books in which other and quite different theories are being given. Then he will learn to compare the theories, to criticise evidence; he will have to weigh for himself a little what a fact will or will not prove, in how many ways it may be interpreted. We need not be in the least discouraged, because his attempts to think are at first astonishingly crude. He will want a good deal of personal attention, but if the tutor will very carefully criticise his first efforts, explaining to him where he has or has not done justice to his facts, where he has made his point clear, what are or are not connected statements, the amount of good sensible thinking which can be got out of quite average men, even somewhat stupid men, is quite surprising.

On the general principles follow three corollaries. 1) We must not perplex the student by carrying principles too far. No doubt, a really able student should learn how exceedingly complex all

theories are, how they are intertwined with other theories, how many modifications and exceptions they will require before they can be applied safely. And as the average man gains power, he too must learn to see something of this, but just in proportion to his stupidity, so we must content ourselves with central facts and broad principles. Only great artists can paint pictures. The rest of us must not try to finish a corner, but at least to sketch; to put in the main lines accurately. For this reason the average man, unlike the clever man, should be allowed to deal with large subjects. It is much easier to follow things on a large scale – easier to see the importance, easier to be interested. 2) If this method be followed, it will be possible also for the average man to deal with more subjects. We all know the old saying: 'Everything about something; something about everything'. I contend that the first belongs essentially to the clever man; the second to the average man. The clever man will generally manage the second part for himself. The average man will never manage the first part at all. And to try and make him do it will kill all the little mind he has. Further, starting new subjects is very difficult. There is always a real hope that our average student will follow up subjects, if he has learnt to understand the principles, and to take an interest in them. He will very rarely begin them for himself. 3) My third point is covered by the hardly less well known remark of the student who 'did not like the professor's lectures, he liked the tutor's. The professor told you what this man said and what that man said, but his tutor told you how it was'. The student was evidently average, and for him the tutor was on the right lines. If you weight such a man with more facts than he can manage, or with theories too highly finished for him to follow, he will sit down under them as helpless as an overladen camel; and it is equally useless to provide him with a large assortment of unreconciled, and to him, unrecognisable, theories. Of course if he is only going to learn what he is told, one theory and twenty theories, an easy theory and an elaborated theory are all equally useless; but if he is to be taught to do his own thinking – which I take to be the whole matter at an issue – then it is a whole world better that he should start thinking an imperfect theory, even one which is wholly wrong, than that he should be left staring, blank and bewildered. For when he once has started, there is every expectation that he will go on. The inadequate will become more adequate, and he will find out what is mistaken. But if he never does start, plainly he will never get anywhere.

In result, the clever man and the stupid will in one respect differ only according to the degree of their ability. Both will have learnt to think, but the former knows an immense amount of facts and has coordinated them into very complete and far-reaching theories, while the latter knows the most important facts and the main theories. In another respect, the difference is more nearly of kind or of ideal. The former only seeks to be at home in regard to a limited subject; the latter should have a reasonably intelligent grasp of the general aspects of most. This corresponds to the place of each in the community. If the clever man is a specialist, the average man is a general practitioner.

There is no need that such methods should be, it is our business to see that they are not, liable to certain obvious criticisms. First, our aim is to get a man to think seriously. However short a distance he can go with his theory, we must make sure that he really understands it, that he is not playing with it or repeating vagueness, that he can use it, apply it, find instances for himself, away from the ground the tutor has taken him over; that he can state it in his own words, modify it where necessary. The relatively few facts he can bring must be accurately known, critically considered, correctly brought in. Nor is there any need that he should be allowed to think that he knows more than he does, or that his theories are more final than they are. He can be shown high-class work. I am only contending that he should be taught always to get as much as he can from it, and, so long as he can get something, neither he nor we should be discouraged because it is not very much. The man who has really learnt to think, to form clear ideas, will very seldom fail to recognise his

limitations. Presumption and narrowness of mind do not come from narrowness of genuine conceptions, but from the absence of them; not from slowness of mental movement, but from incapacity to move.

In the clerical profession, all this is peculiarly serious. The Church takes a very great responsibility for each priest separately in that she provides his ‘practice’ for him, she does not ‘make’ it. I need not refer to the young doctor who tries talking agnosticism, or the smart journalist who brings up huge criticism, for these are expert issues and occasional. But in any afternoon’s visiting, the first old washerwoman in ten minutes account of her religious experience and views will have moved, illustrated or assumed, more controversial issues in psychology, theory of religions, doctrine of knowledge, and their resultants in the theological sphere, than four professors will entangle them in three terms. Let us consider the young curate. First, he must deal with her himself. She is not acquainted with the professorial views, and further, in as much as the professor never met that particular washerwoman, there will be nothing in the treatises which by itself will fit her case. Secondly, fortunately for him, she does not require a carefully balanced answer. She does not go beyond very broad and crude issues, just as he has learnt to understand – provided he has learnt to understand anything. But thirdly, there is no possibility of getting that ‘adequate knowledge of the facts’ which scholars love. No doubt there is an immense deal more which is very important, but then she does not know what it is, and she will lose her temper if he ‘badgers’. From what is before him he must make up his own mind what she is really driving at, what it means, how he can help her, and then translate his own notions into a form she can follow, all within five minutes.

This is the problem in hand, and I cannot feel that university education as it is conducted helps us to solve it, even for a clever man. As an expert he will perhaps make mincemeat of the doctor, the smart journalist, the atheist lecturer, but he can only gasp before the washerwoman. She moves too many issues and too informally. Many of them are ‘not his subject’. However, we do not propose to expend our able men on the worthy lady, but what will the university do for the average man to whom she is a sample case of his normal work? I am not confident.

To a very large number, a university means just so many classics. The course is, however, being widened. It is now usual to add history, perhaps the elements of chemistry and physics. Perhaps I ought to feel satisfied, but I do not. What are the history and the chemistry, and how are they taught? Some real knowledge of modern science is essential to any thinking man, but then it should not be elementary, but advanced, exceedingly advanced. Elementary chemistry is an excellent thing for the school, but an educated man wants the main principles of the science for his own thinking. A series of popular lectures dealing with that is much more to the point, except that the student should be required to definitely work from them, to study, repeat a few typical experiments. English history, again, is a school study. The education of a man consists in learning to see how forms and policies are dominated by ideas. And as I have pointed out, the average man is not capable of doing this for himself, simply as the history itself is put before him. Our honour lectures at Oxford did teach us this. Is it being taught even more carefully in the pass schools? Is the student being brought to see what was the mental habit which underlay the mediaeval theory of an empire or a Papacy; what was the change in mental attitude which brought about the Renaissance? If not our new width of teaching is only repeating multifariously the single error which was of old. If you provide a clever man with a rich assortment of building materials, he will generally build by instinct and imitation; with the stupid man this is precisely the thing you have to spend all your best labour in teaching him.

And I cannot leave the subject without saying that there is nothing of which this is so true as it is of the classics. The difference of conception, mental habit and aim which underlie differences of policy or institution are relatively easy to understand, but the subtlety of those which determine literary style defy explanation, and the merely average man cannot be taught how to understand by means which cannot be explained, although when he has begun to see his way the latter may be a very helpful subsidiary illustration.

II

So far, I have ventured to criticise the universities on quite general grounds. My contention is that in order to gain the end we want, for the average man, the teaching should turn directly on the higher and philosophical aspects of the question: the kind of things we get in 'Essays on History', 'Theories of Natural Science', rather than on the history and science itself. Even his first facts should be visibly going to mean something. The building theories should begin at once, and this will require a great deal of personal tuition to ensure that the man really does follow, that he is working them out in his mind, and not merely repeating vaguenesses. All his further reading should be consciously providing for the increase, modification, elaboration, illustration, criticism of those ideas. Personally, I am inclined to believe that this method is sound in all cases, but I leave that for the consideration of the wise.

I had better now mind my own business. I must try to explain why I am sure this system is at least necessary for the training of the clergy, and why I have been driven to think that the university system is wholly wrong even for the most able of them. I can speak only as a Christian, a Churchman and a priest, in the hope that those who do not agree with us will at least be helped to understand our position, and that it is reasonable and consecutive. We have not taken it up merely on obscurantist grounds.

Education, we perhaps agree, is addressed to universals; to the habit of bringing details of all kinds into mental relation with the laws which underlie and interpret them. As religious men, we believe the universe to be the expression, its laws the operation, of God's will. So long as the laws are constant that affects our study of them only by way of reverence; but in our use of them we see they have a purpose to be known not in them but only in God Himself. Our minds hanker after unity of idea, but we only gain knowledge by diversity. No calculation is safe except by the concurrence of different lines of investigation. So therefore while the normal life is a great natural induction from things to laws, and a reaching from laws after God in Whom all meet; it is the peculiarity of Christianity that it offers us an alternative view of life, in the Gospel of Christ Who came out from God to meet us on the same road.

The Incarnation came once in the history of the race, but the Gospel provided for its perpetual presentation before men day by day, in the sacraments, which are the *efficacia signa* of Grace and Worship, and in the ministry of teaching and influence. Our training of the priest must be based on our view of the priesthood. I have tried to state the theological view. I admit that it is not very commonly held, and that it is, therefore, not easy to follow. The much more usual alternative is to regard the clergyman as concerned with religious affairs, in much the same way as the doctor is concerned with health and the lawyer with law.

Now it is evident that this parallel is seriously defective. My health and my legal doings occupy certain spheres of my life, but normally the less I have to do with either, the better for me. The

business of the experts is to save me as much as possible from ever thinking of the subjects. These spheres are in some contact with one another. A lawyer may have a medical case, but not really as medical. In themselves the spheres are exclusive. But if religion is a sphere, it is certainly not exclusive. If there is any sense in our religion – it would be more accurate to say in our 'faith' – it ought to enter into everything. We all feel the difficulty of understanding quite how it does, but I think we should all agree that to narrow it down to a sphere, to confine it to formal worship and our future state, is to take the heart out of it. It is the primary business of its experts to make us think of it, not as little, but as much as possible. How then should they be taught to regard it, to understand it, in this way?

I contend therefore that that 'sphere' theory is wholly wrong. The priest has no doubt a little parochial business to look after, but he has no 'sphere' of his own in the exclusive sense of the word. He is concerned with everything with which laymen are concerned, not as being one of them, not in the way in which they are concerned with it, but from a somewhat different point of view. The civil engineer lays a railway line, the railway engineer directed it for the intercourse and commerce of cities and provinces. The priest is not an expert in either business, yet he ought to be keenly interested in seeing how God has given the strength of steel to the service of men and has made all people to have need and help one another. He has no special illumination on how such things should be done, though he ought to be keenly interested in it, but he has a great deal to suggest on the *why*, on what makes them worth doing. He takes us away from dividends – though even they are capable of spiritual interpretation – he is the witness of love and the triumph of love over the uses of the world.

This is only an illustration of my fundamental principle. The layman begins from things, from facts, and is educated into principles and laws. Beyond those lies the realm of motives, stretching in some uncertain way which our minds cannot follow to a great unity where they must meet. Hesitatingly we call it God. To the priest, this ultimate end, God made known in Christ, is the beginning of thought. He follows the divergence of the lines outwards to their application among all the variety of things. This theology is a reversed science. Often enough inductive in practice, but deductive in general idea. It is not one science, for it involves a co-ordination of all from a certain very practical point of view. It involves a theory of knowledge. The doctrine of God is largely metaphysical, while the conception of creation must be in contact with physical theory. The doctrine of man involves psychology and evolution, biological and historical. Ethics and morality are concerned with sociology, the relation of individuals to the community. Whatever we are to think of the Revelation of Christ and the system of the Church, it is as an answer to all these problems. The priest does not know his Creed as an expert, unless he can follow it outwards till he reaches the problems of currency, the system of banking and the question of the unemployed. That his *a priori* method will provide any directly practical suggestions for the answer of those questions is just what I do not mean. They are the layman's true work, but the very fact that the priest is entering them, is interested in them, from a different side, is no small matter. It witnesses to the connection of the limited problem with other issues. It will affect greatly the spirit in which they are approached, the kind of answers with which we are inclined to be content.

I have admitted that very few of us clergy are capable of giving this kind of help. Except very dimly, we have not even dreamt of its existence. We have all been trained under the shadow of the university idea. Now a university is a place of general scientific education. That one notion of an induction is common throughout; it constitutes quite correctly, its ideal of culture. Of old it was represented only on one side; everyone studied the science of language, of literary style. Now in

history, natural science and so forth, we have added alternative methods. Beyond the general mental training lies the application of its method in the science of the particular sphere, law, medicine, engineering and the like. The older universities still try to keep the general and the special apart; the newer are inclined to make them go together. I need not discuss the practical question of which is better. Both are quite intelligible on the educational principles I have laid down.

But where in this scheme does theology come in? The older universities regard it as the ideal course that a man should first take a general arts school, such as 'Greats' at Oxford, or classics at Cambridge, and then read theology; that is the would-be priest is first educated as a layman and then specialises in his own sphere. I have insisted that theology cannot be so treated. Let us take the system as typical and look at its results. Our student is ordained and goes on his parish. Assuming that he has ideas outside golf and sport, he can talk genially on many subjects as an educated man should on parish councils, poor relief and the state of trade. But he is a minister of religion and uncomfortably aware that he is not paid simply to be a Christian layman. He wants to do his business. Where has his 'sphere' gone to? He cannot very well bring in the Homoousion or Higher Criticism. Towards the close, if very much in earnest, he makes an effort to get in an observation or two on prayer, attendance at church or the Sunday school treat. No one would dare to talk of being saved, which is supposed to mean something to do with the hereafter. The laity listen in a polite silence, and when he is gone, remark 'Pity the clergy will be so professional'.

For once, I am writing in a lay journal, and I hope I may be excused if I speak with a somewhat personal tone. I quite admit the justice of your criticism of us, but is it not equally true that you feel we are more to blame because we are so unprofessional? I want to face both criticisms, for I maintain both are justified, and there is the same reason for both. If theology is merely one sphere, we have no more right to drag the laity into it than the doctor has for dragging in our digestions, circulations and other apparatus, which we had far better forget. I know there are laymen who entirely accept that, who assert that a priest should be just another layman, unless someone chooses to go to him in his official capacity. But I do not think this assertion really expresses even the mind of those who make it. I believe that almost all laymen feel that, while they must work in their own way, yet there is another and wider view of things, different from it, complementary to it, and that they would be very grateful to anyone who would help them see it at times, who could make it more real to them. I could collect some curious admissions to that effect from men like Huxley and Sedgwick. Surely the error of the young parson in my instance lay in his imagining that the will of God and the love of God are somehow more connected with Sunday schools and going to church than they are with parish councils, and going to the poll, and this is a very great error. The former do come into his special 'sphere', like Higher Criticism, and he has always been accustomed to think of a sphere. He has never learnt theology as a way of life.

Is not that a matter of thinking? Why is theology in practice always handled so narrowly? I can answer that from my own experience. I explained at the beginning that we were dealing mostly with a certain class, and that we educated them in theology. If I may quote the verdict, they are, by common consent broadminded and thoughtful men with an intensely vivid interest in all kinds of things; but they never forget their own standpoint. Their interest comes from that: they are always working from it. Our experience of graduates is not as large as that of many other places, but then we have been in a position to compare the two. I can only express the results of our observation in this way. Except in the rarest cases you cannot make a man's mind twice. When he has once been really educated in Arts, learned to look at things in that way, he is quite willing to learn about what belongs to his own sphere, but to ask him to sit down, to begin all over again, to learn another

wholly different way of contemplating the world is quite useless. He cannot do it, and he will not do it. Perhaps he might after twenty or thirty years of priestly life, but very few do.

In practice, however, it is seldom necessary, it is not even usual, to take the theological school after the Arts school. Is there not any reason why it should not be developed on its own parallel lines? Let us look at the facts. Is there any university which has done it? Is there any university theological school which even its own professors feel to be really satisfactory? Is there any towards which the professors in other faculties are not somewhat contemptuous? It is a daring thing for an outsider to intrude upon such inner workings. It is a very sore point, but I think everyone feels the position to be uncomfortable and unsatisfactory. The professors at the older universities have frankly replied that theology proper could not be taught in a university. They could only give the materials for it.

I have myself puzzled over these facts for a long time; and have only lately brought myself to accept them. The university is dominated by Arts, the idea of sciences essentially – what I have called – inductive. I have maintained that the other system of thought is so different that while those who work on one can learn a great deal from those who work on the other, yet no one mind – except in very rare instances – can work habitually on both. To have learnt one is not a help but an all-but insuperable hindrance, to learning the other. I contend now, with the university professors, that the two are so different that they cannot even be taught in the same place. I have referred to the sense of strain as regards the professors of the two; it is much more marked in the students. At Oxford and Cambridge, 'Theology' is an Arts school, not well thought of by students, but tolerated. In two institutions where it was taught by itself, those who followed it were completely ignored by the other students. It is inevitable. When young men are trying to work out entirely different lines of thought, they will only quarrel and get in each other's way. When they have finished, it will be different. Then they can look over the result. They can afford to recognise its limitations and do justice to other results. Chaplains may be, or might be, very useful in barrack rooms and the mess room, but I do not think there would be any advantage in trying to get Sandhurst and Cuddesdon under one roof.

The actual results of the present system are 1) that our clergy have never learnt that theologic or God-ward side of the world which is really their contribution to the thought of the age; 2) that they have at most only a very vague idea that there is, or ought to be, such a thing; 3) that the Church has not got it to teach. I am convinced that this state of things will continue until we are allowed to take our young ordinands 'apart into desert places', think it out quietly for ourselves, build up their minds in its fashion, model our lives upon it. No! The laity need not be afraid. We shall not come back narrow and dogmatic. You can see more of a river from a balloon, and of a wood from a hill top, and we shall see more of the world as a whole from our quiet retreat than we can while we are swimming and blundering about in it. And it is just those 'wholes' that we want to study. No doubt you have learned a great deal by swimming which we shall not have learnt, but there will be something we really can talk about which we should never have seen if we had stuck by your side. Indeed, what use should we be if we could only do what you are doing, see what you are seeing. We are not cleverer men than yourselves; you have your own experts. God forbid we should pretend to be better men. We are only men whose business it is to see the other side of things, to remind you that it is there, to tell you what it is like; so that you can keep up your confidence and know it when you come to it in your own very different way. When we come back, we shall have a great deal to learn, but I think you will find us much more willing and anxious to learn than we are at present. Narrowness and dogmatism are inevitable when men believe in something very strongly, and never learn quite to understand or trust it. That is just our present position.

The argument that such separate training will put the clergy out of touch with the modern and the lay mind, does not therefore move me. By all confession it could hardly do so more than the present system. I have tried to show why. There is more apparent force in the argument that we weaken the Christian cause by removing so many Christian students from the university, but this is a matter on which I feel very strongly. It is the greatest weakness of the Church of England that as her clergy have never properly understood their own work, they are always intruding into the work of the laity, and the latter, not without a good deal of dissatisfaction, have left it to them accordingly. It has come to be a sort of assumption that being pious all the time is the parson's particular business; that any man who is thus steadily pious is 'rather like a parson'; that the average layman can hardly be expected to be 'parsony' except at intervals. I do not say that this ghastly attitude is universal, but it is far more common than it ought to be. Non-Conformity has made no such error. Every layman there knows what he can get from his minister, but he knows also what he must do for himself. The minister is *his* minister. If Non-Conformity is to extend, to be shown, explained, maintained, out of doors, it is the layman, and not the minister, who must do it; and to an enormously greater extent than with us., he is ready to do so. He knows his own principles and is ready to fight for them on any opportunity. He never dreams of 'leaving it to the parson'.

The Church of England will never advance either in the country or in the university, till she learns the same lesson. This is the central thing for which I contend. The clergy are honest, hard-working Englishmen. When they know what their own work is they will do it. When they do not, then they will try to do other things, which they cannot do, which only the layman can do. Christianity in the university must be maintained by the influence of Christian students, not by the ordinands. As to the latter, it would be an excellent thing for those of marked intellectual power, when they have finished their course, and learnt to understand what is meant by a meeting of all things in relation to the will of God, to go to a university, and take up some one branch of scientific study, specialise in it, and see how they can work it out in detail. You cannot specialise in theology, for it has none of the necessary characteristics of a speciality, but when you have learnt it as a whole, you can very easily specialise your theology in one scientific direction.

Herbert Kelly